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THE MEDICARE CATASTROPHIC COVERAGE
ACT OF 1988: ISSUES OF EQUITY IN A
POLICY REVERSAL
Joseph C. Morreale, Ph.D. *
In his February 1986 State of the Union Address to Congress, President
Ronald Reagan directed his Secretary of Health and Human Services, Otis
R. Bowen, to develop proposals to better protect Americans against
catastrophic health care expenditures.' In November 1986 Secretary Bowen
released a report that addressed three separate needs: (i) catastrophic acute
care costs for the Medicare population; (ii) long term care costs for the
Medicare population; and (iii) catastrophic costs for the non-Medicare
population.2
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act3 (MCCA or Act) was the re-
sulting legislation passed by Congress that focused on the first of these three
concerns. President Reagan signed this bill into law on July 1, 1988, calling
it a program that will "help remove a terrible threat from the lives of elderly
and disabled Americans."4 The Act represented the largest expansion of the
federal Medicare program since its inception in 1965. Yet, only sixteen
months later, on November 22, 1989, Congress repealed this "landmark"
health insurance program for the elderly and disabled.'
This article investigates the causes and consequences of this swift and un-
precedented health care policy reversal. In particular, the article will focus
* Professor of Public Administration and Adjunct Professor of Health Law, Pace
University.
1. R. REAGAN, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,
February 4, 1986, in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 128
(1986).
2. See Rovner, Issue is Gaining Political Momentum: Lawmakers Taking Hard Look at
Problem of Long-Term Care, 46 CONG. Q. 938, 938 (1988); Rovner, House Adopts Conference
Report: Catastrophic-Costs Measure Ready for Final Hill Approval, 46 CONG. Q. 1494, 1494-95
(1988); Rovner, Reagan Threatens a Veto. House OKs Medicare Expansion Despite Reserva-
tions Over Cost, 45 CONG. Q. 1637, 1637 (1987); Catastrophic-Costs Bill Is Sent to White House,
46 CONG. Q. 1606, 1606-11 (1988).
3. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
4. Reagan Signs Catastrophic-Care Bill, 46 CONG. Q. 1865, 1865 (1988).
5. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat.
1979.
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on the equity issues involved in catastrophic health care expenditures by ad-
dressing the following questions: Who would have benefitted from this pro-
gram?; Who was to pay for the program?; Why was it reversed?; And,
finally, what have we learned? The article concludes that Congress and the
President broke with traditionally held principles of economic equity in
American policy-making when they drafted the MCCA. They erred signifi-
cantly in placing the financial burden on the elderly-especially on the afflu-
ent elderly-while only a minority of the elderly actually benefitted from this
program. While the costs were front-loaded, some of the benefits were to be
phased-in over a period of years. To the elderly, this financing strategy
made the costs appear more expensive relative to the Act's benefits. Finally,
the Act raised the elderly's fear of further rising costs, in the form of pre-
mium and tax payments, and failed to address their real concern-long-term
care.6 ?
This article proceeds in six sections. Section I defines the general concept
of economic equity and describes four types relevant to this analysis. Section
II describes the economic position of the elderly and their health care'ex-
penditures. Section III presents the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act
and offers an analysis of its financial impact on the elderly. Section IV dis-
cusses the causes of the MCCA's reversal. Section V analyzes the continu-
ing and unresolved issues of economic equity for the elderly, and Section VI
offers some conclusions and suggestions for future policy consideration.
I. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
A. Defining Economic Equity
The concern for equity is fundamentally important to policy-making. H.
George Frederickson, in his twenty-year retrospective article on the concept
of social equity in public policy, has again brought this concern to our atten-
tion.7 The public finance literature in the field of economics has long recog-
nized the just distribution of society's scarce resources as one of the
generally accepted functions of government.' Proceeding from an economic
perspective, this article analyzes a public policy which includes catastrophic
health care expenditures for the elderly, emphasizing economic equity rather
than social equity.
6. For a discussion of long-term care, see generally Meiners & Trapnell, Long-term Care
Insurance: Premium Estimates for Prototype Policies, 22 MED. CARE 901 (1984).
7. See generally Frederickson, Public Administration and Social Equality, 50 PuB. AD-
MIN. REV. 228 (1990).
8. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 9-11
(5th ed. 1989).
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"Economic equity," generally defined as a fair distribution of economic
outcomes in a society, has two dimensions. The first, distributional equity,
relates to adjustments in the outcomes of the market system to create a bet-
ter distribution of goods and services. The second, contributional equity,
involves establishing a fair system of required revenue contribution for the
provision of public goods and services.
There are two general approaches to distributional equity, both of which
focus on defining a fair entitlement to publicly provided services. The uni-
versal approach provides entitlement to social benefits primarily as an
earned right, regardless of income, to an entire category of citizens. The
advantages of this approach are that the public services are high quality,
equal for all, and easy to administer. The disadvantages are that the services
are often very costly and protect many individuals who are not generally
considered "in need."
In contrast, the selective (categorical) approach provides social benefits to
a specified group based upon financial need. This approach better serves the
poor and is much less costly. However, it frequently suffers from an inability
to garnish political support for the dependent population. Even when the
approach is successful, it sometimes results in "second-class" services for
this population.
With contributional equity, there are also two general approaches-the
benefits principle and the ability-to-pay principle. The benefits principle
rests upon an equitable financing system that receives taxpayer contributions
in line with the benefits derived from the public service. A truly equitable
system depends upon the expenditure structure; tax revenues and tax ex-
penditures are therefore determined simultaneously, with tax policy and tax
expenditure policy determining the extent of the benefits. However, in order
to allocate the tax bill equitably, the benefits for each taxpayer must be deter-
mined in advance, which is a central problem with contributional equity. In
addition, those who are the beneficiaries are also the least likely to be able to
pay. In effect, the benefits principle assumes that a proper state of distribu-
tion exists a priori.
In contrast, the ability-to-pay principle maintains that individuals should
contribute to the provision of a public service in accordance with their finan-
cial resources. The tax funding problem is viewed independently from ex-
penditure-determination because two sub-principles, horizontal and vertical
equity, develop the ability-to-pay principle. The former requires people with
equal financial capacity to make the same financial sacrifices. The latter re-
quires people with unequal capacity to pay different amounts-those with a
greater financial capacity will pay more, while those with a lesser financial
1991]
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capacity will pay less. While the ability-to-pay approach better addresses the
redistribution problem, it undermines the provision of appropriate funding
for public services. Moreover, it is difficult to measure an individual's ability
to pay.
B. Types of Economic Equity
Four types of economic equity will be addressed in this article. The first
focuses on the equity within the elderly population-intraelderly equity. In-
traelderly equity relates to horizontal equity by attempting to treat each aged
person equally through the provision of equal benefits while making an equal
distribution of the financial burden. There is also a dimension of vertical
equity; different members of the aged have different levels of economic abil-
ity-to-pay, and therefore, those elderly persons with more ability-to-pay
would pay more for their health care.
The second type of economic equity is the equity across the United States
in both the elderly and non-elderly populations. In this context, it is impor-
tant to recognize the relationship between the economic status of the elderly
vis-a-vis the non-elderly in the population. This relates to vertical equity,
and is referred to as intergroup equity. Those members of society who are
more able to pay for health care would contribute accordingly.
The third aspect of economic equity is familial, e.g., between the elderly
and their offspring. This type of equity is based upon the potential transfer
of wealth within the family from one generation to the next. Since cata-
strophic health care expenditures pose a threat to the maintenance of the
wealth of the elderly, the children have a vested interest not only in the
health of their elderly parents but also in the financial stability and protec-
tion of their wealth. This makes the transfer of funds for services and finan-
cial protection an equity issue across extended families. This is interfamily
equity.
The final type of economic equity involves concern for equity across gen-
erations. This differs from the previous type of equity because it focuses on
the distribution of resources between the elderly and the children within the
entire society. There is increasing concern about the "over-allocation" of
resources toward the elderly and the "under-allocation" of resources to the
Nation's children. This has become a growing political issue and has direct
bearing on the competition for health care resources between the young and
the old. This type of equity will be referred to as intergenerational equity.
All of these views of equity will be considered in light of the health care
expenditures of the elderly, especially as evidenced in Federal Medicare
policy.
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II. INCOME AND HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES OF THE ELDERLY
A. The Financial Capacity of the Elderly
The traditional view of the elderly is that they are a relatively poor and
dependent group in the population:
Despite gains in recent years, the elderly, for the most part, are not
a prosperous group. Half of the families with an elderly member
had incomes below twice the poverty level in 1981 .... In con-
trast, 30 percent of persons in families without an aged member
have incomes under twice the poverty level.9
Data concerning the more recent economic status of the elderly in com-
parison to the non-elderly population are reported in Table 1. Median and
mean income increase as the age of the head of household rises, and they
peak in the forty-five to fifty-five age bracket. The elderly have the lowest
median income, and their mean income is the second lowest of all income
groups by age. Average annual expenditures on health care also rise as age
increases, and the elderly incur the highest average annual health care ex-
penditures. After calculating the percentage of health care expenditures for
average income, the result shows that, of all the groups, the elderly spend the
greatest percentage of their income on health care.
Wealth status is another indicator of financial state. Median net worth is
also reported in Table I across all age groups. This wealth measure in-
creases as age increases, but it peaks in the fifty-five to sixty-four age bracket.
While the elderly have low median and mean incomes, the elderly still have
substantial relative wealth, which averages almost twice the net worth posi-
tion of the average for all age groups.
A reliable indicator of relative economic position in society is the percent-
age of income distribution of a specific age group relative to the distribution
in the total population. Table 2 demonstrates that the income distribution of
the elderly is much lower than that of the whole population. Approximately
one-third of the elderly have incomes below $10,000, while less than one-
fifth of the entire population have an income below this amount. Approxi-
mately one-quarter of the elderly have incomes of $25,000 or greater,
whereas over half of the total population have these incomes. Overall, the
median income of the elderly is only fifty-five percent of the median income
of the population.
One study estimated the income of the elderly from unpublished Social
9. K. DAVIS & D. ROWLAND, MEDICARE POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HEALTH
AND LONG-TERM CARE 35 (1986).
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TABLE 1: HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND AVERAGE ANNUAL HEALTH
CARE EXPENDITURE BY AGE GROUP: U.S. (1986 & 1987)
Avg. Avg. Ann.
Median Mean Annual H.C. Exp. % Median
Age Income Income H.C. Exp. of Median Net
Group 1987' 1984' 19862 Income4  Worth3
15-24 16,204 19,504 336 1.72
25-34 26,923 30,200 686 2.27 (< 35)5,764
35-44 34,929 39,529 1005 2.54 35,581
45-54 37,250 43,796 1172 2.68 56,791
55-64 27,538 34,818 1303 3.74 73,664
65 + 14,334 20,333 16504 8.11 60,266
Total 25,986 32,144 1062 3.30 32,667
SOURCE: U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 441-42 (1989)
2 Id. at 437
Id. at 459
4 Author's calculations
TABLE 2: INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF ELDERLY AND TOTAL
POPULATION: U.S. (1987)
Inequality Relative
Position of the
Elderly Total Population Elderly'
Income Group (%) (%) (Elderly/Total Pop.)
< 5000 9.9 6.9 1.43
5,000-9,999 24.5 11.5 2.13
10,000-14,999 17.8 10.6 1.68
15,000-24,999 22.1 19.2 1.15
25,000-34,999 11.5 16.1 0.71
35,000-49,999 7.9 17.2 0.46
50,000-74,999 4.1 12.2 0.34
75,000 + 2.3 6.3 0.37
Median Income $14,334 25,986 0.55
Mean Income 20,333 32,144 0.63
SOURCE: U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 441-42 (1989)
Author's estimates
.122
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Security Administration data covering the year 1984.10 Table 3 portrays the
average income and distribution of income of the elderly by age bracket.
The median income of the elderly in 1984 was $13,460, with over one-third
having incomes below $10,000. As age increases, the median income falls,
and the percentage with income below $10,000 increases to almost half.
Since the risk of illness (especially chronic illness) rises with age, these data
reveal that, as this risk rises, there is a reduction in the ability of the elderly
to finance their health care needs.
TABLE 3. FAMILY TOTAL MONEY INCOME BY AGE, SEX, AND
MARITAL STATUS (1984)
Percentage distribution of aged units
Median Less than $5,000- $10,000- $15,000- $30,000
Groups Income $5,000 $9,999 $14,999 $29,000 or more
All persons
Age 65 + $13,460 11.8% 25.9% 17.1% 26.5% 18.6%
65-69 $16,420 8.6 20.8 16.4 31.7 22.7
70-74 $13,600 11.1 25.7 18.3 26.8 18.2
75-79 $11,810 12.9 29.5 18.2 24.7 14.5
80 + $10,810 16.7 30.4 15.8 20.4 16.9
Married couples
Age 65 + $18,670 2.1 14.6 20.4 37.0 25.8
65-69 $21,880 1.9 9.2 16.4 40.9 31.5
70-74 $18,670 1.8 15.1 20.1 37.7 25.5
75-79 $15,910 2.0 19.1 26.2 33.5 19.3
80 + $14,140 4.3 24.1 26.2 27.4 18.1
Non-married individuals
Age 65 + $ 9,580 18.4 33.3 14.9 19.7 13.7
65-69 $10,450 15.7 32.8 16.2 22.1 13.3
70-74 $ 9,500 18.4 34.0 16.9 18.2 12.5
75-79 $ 9,030 18.9 35.0 13.9 20.1 11.9
80 + $ 9,250 20.4 32.3 12.7 18.2 16.4
SOURCE: Cohen, Tell, Greenberg & Wallack, The Financial Capacity of the Elderly to
Insure for Long-Term Care, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 494, 496 (1987)
B. Defining Catastrophic Health Care Expenditures
What are financially catastrophic health care expenditures? A distinction
10. Cohen, Tell, Greenberg & Wallack, The Financial Capacity of the Elderly to Insure for
Long-Term Care, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 494, 496-97 (1987) [hereinafter Cohen].
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must be made between financially catastrophic health expenditures and high
cost health care.
Frequently, catastrophic expenditures are considered a high threshold
amount of health care expenditures. Some argue that a certain level, e.g.,
$5000 per year, is catastrophic. Others argue that it should be based on
ability to pay, contending that anything above a certain amount, e.g., ten
percent of annual income, is catastrophic to a household. The first assertion
takes the position that equity is determined by the benefits principle. That
is, all elderly are treated equally when they are faced with equally high cost
health care expenditures. In contrast, the latter position asserts that equity
is determined by the ability-to-pay principle.
However, high cost health care is neither a necessary nor sufficient condi-
tion for health care expenditures to be considered catastrophic to an individ-
ual or household. S.E. Berki states that a health care expenditure is
considered catastrophic "when it endangers the family's ability to maintain
its customary standard of living."" Leon Wyszewianski concurs, arguing
that financially catastrophic health care expenditures should be restricted to
"situations in which expenditures are considered large relative to the pa-
tient's ability to pay, as determined by the extent of third-party coverage and
other resources available to pay for care." 12
Expenditures that are burdensome to family economic resources should be
of primary concern. In this way, health care expenditures are considered in
relation to a measure of family economic resources. Individual or family
income is the most generally accepted measure of family financial ability, but
household wealth, health insurance coverage, and tax burden need to be ana-
lyzed as well. These factors will provide a more accurate view of an individ-
ual's ability to pay.
To note, only out-of-pocket health care expenditures require examination
since the remainder is paid by third parties. Out-of-pocket expenditures
would include health insurance premiums. Hence, three different thresholds
are often used in discussions of catastrophic health expenditures, namely,
out-of-pocket health expenditures that exceed five, ten, or fifteen percent of
household income.
Another issue considers the type of health care expenditures analyzed.
Most discussions of the general issue of catastrophic health expenditures fo-
cus on acute health care expenditures. For the elderly, however, expendi-
11. Berki, A Look at Catastrophic Medical Expenses and the Poor, 5 HEALTH AFF. 138,
138 (1986).
12. Wyszewianski, Financially Catastrophic and High-Cost Cases: Definitions, Distinctions,
and Their Implications for Policy Formulation, 23 INQUIRY 382, 383 (1986).
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tures on maintenance care become critically important. This is seen
particularly in long-term care where expenditures can be exceedingly large
both in absolute terms and in terms relative to family financial resources.
Since, under the MCCA, long-term care was left uncovered, coverage was
mainly for acute-care health expenditures for non-institutionalized elderly
patients.' 3 Consequently, much of this article focuses on acute health care
expenditures.' 4
C. Health Care Expenditures By the Elderly
The elderly clearly have much higher health care expenditures than other
members of the population. The latest data available from Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA), a division of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), are presented in Table 4. Of the almost $450
billion spent on personal health care in the United States in 1987, $162 bil-
lion was spent on the elderly. Thus, the aged, who comprise about twelve
percent of the population, account for a little over one-third of all health
care expenditures. Moreover, the per capita health care spending for the
elderly was three times the national average. However, these data are very
general and provide very broad estimates which include both acute and long-
term care expenditures.
TABLE 4: PERSONAL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES BY AGE:
U.S. (1987)
Personal Health Care Per Capita
Age Group Population Expenditures Amount
(W) (%) ($b) (%) ($)
< 19 years 69.7 27.7 51.9 11.6 745
19-64 151.9 60.3 231.1 52.2 1,535
65 + 30.2 12.0 162.0 36.2 5,360
All ages 251.7 100.0 447.0 100.0 1,776
SOURCE: Health Expenditures by Age Group, 1977 and 1987, 10 HEALTH CARE FIN.
REV. 167 (Fall 1987)
Karen Davis and Diane Rowland, in their analysis of Medicare policy,
found two characteristics of acute-care health expenditures for Medicare re-
13. See Pepper, Adding Indigence to Injury: America's Long-Term Insurance Gap, 15 J.
LEGIS. 15, 18 (1988) ("The new legislation does address the issue of long-term care, but it does
so in an inadequate fashion.").
14. Acute health care contemplates "health services other than preventive or long-term
care." Christensen, Long & Rodgers, Acute Health Care Costs for the Medicare Population:
Overview and Policy Options, 65 MILBANK Q. 397, 397.(1987) [hereinafter Christensen].
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cipients.' 5 First, health care expenditures on the aged are very unevenly
distributed. The authors report that for 1983, seven percent of the aged ac-
counted for sixty-five percent of all Medicare payments. Second, high cost
health care affected only a minority of the elderly. In 1980 seven percent of
the elderly spent over $5,000 on health care, and fifteen percent spent be-
tween $1,000 and $5,000.16
A third characteristic of acute-care expenditures, verified in other studies,
is that catastrophic burdens do not necessarily derive from high cost health
expenditures. Another study, using an analysis similar to that employed by
Davis and Rowland, compared the health care expenditures of the popula-
tion under sixty-five years of age with the population sixty-five years of age
and older. 7 It found that the health care expenditures incurred by the eld-
erly were two to four times greater than those which the population under
sixty-five years of age incurred. Moreover, the top ten percent of the elderly
accounted for over two-thirds of total acute-care health expenditures of the
elderly population, and the top ten percent of the non-elderly account for
almost three-quarters of the total acute health care expenditures of their
group.
Sandra Christensen, Stephen Long, and Jack Rodgers reached similar
conclusions.' 8 They reported that in 1987 the average acute-care expendi-
tures per elderly Medicare enrollee was $3,351. Hospitalization was the
most important factor in the high cost of such care. Average expenditures
for the nonhospitalized aged Medicare recipient was $817, but for the hospi-
talized recipient they were $12,213. Analyzing the distribution of acute-
care expenditures across the elderly, the twenty-two percent who were hospi-
talized accounted for eighty percent of the total acute-care costs for the
aged. In terms of out-of-pocket expenditures, Medicare enrollees pay nearly
eleven percent of acute-care expenditures. Another seventeen and one-half
percent of these expenditures are paid by Medicare enrollees for insurance
premiums. The latter include premiums for Medicare Part B coverage or for
private supplementary coverage. "
The Cohen study also reported the proportion of income which the elderly
spent on necessities by income class based on the Consumer Expenditure
Survey for the elderly from 1980-1981.2" By focusing on the percentage of
15. DAVIS & ROWLAND, supra note 9, at 34.
16. Id. at 34-35.
17. Garfinkel, Riley & Iannacchione, High-Cost Users of Medical Care, 9 HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV. 41 (Summer 1988).
18. Christensen, supra note 14, at 399.
19. Id.
20. Cohen, supra note 10, at 497-98.
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out-of-pocket medical expenses by income class, the overall average is nine
and two-tenths percent, with most elderly income groups amounting to be-
tween eight and twelve percent. This percentage falls below ten percent
(ranging between four and seven percent) only for the highest income
group.2 In addition, Judith Feder, Marilyn Moon, and William Scanlon
(Feder study) reported that the elderly spent an average of eleven and two-
tenths percent of their per capita income on acute health care.22 Over one-
fifth spent more than fifteen percent of their income on acute health care.23
Moreover, over ninety percent of the elderly with catastrophic health care
expenditures had per capita incomes of less than $10,000.24
The Feder study also confirmed that catastrophic burdens do not come
from large dollar expenditures.25 Two-thirds of the elderly spent less than
$1,500 on health care, and only fifteen and six-tenths percent spent $2,000 or
more on health care. 26 Elderly with per capita incomes of $10,000 or less
(poor elderly) incurred out-of-pocket expenses which averaged fourteen per-
cent of income.27 This rate was roughly two times the share paid by the
elderly with incomes greater than $10,000 (non-poor elderly).28 Using an
amount greater than fifteen percent of income as a measure of catastrophic
health care expenditures, there is a sharp differential impact on the poor as
opposed to the non-poor elderly. Almost one-quarter of all elderly incurred
catastrophic expenses. Of this group, over one-third of the poor elderly had
this expense, compared with only about six percent of the non-poor
elderly.2 9
What accounts for the high expenditures on acute-care for the elderly?
Davis and Rowland reported that Medicare cost sharing and the Medicare
Part B premium accounted for over half of high cost acute-care expenses.
Moreover, spending on uncovered services (particularly prescription drugs)
accounted for almost another third of these expenses.3
21. Author's calculations are based on data reported at Christensen, supra note 14, at 399.
22. Feder, Moon & Scanlon, Medicare Reform: Nibbling at Catastrophic Costs, 6 HEALTH
AFF. 5, 7 (Winter 1987).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 7-8.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id.
30. DAVIS & ROWLAND, supra note 9, at 35.
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III. THE MEDICARE CATASTROPHIC COVERAGE ACT OF 1988
A. Health Care Financing for the Elderly Prior to MCCA
Before the passage of MCCA, many of the elderly were able to finance
catastrophic health care expenditures through the purchase of private Medi-
gap insurance. 31 These policies were designed to cover the deductibles and
copayments required under Medicare. Christensen, Long, and Rodgers ana-
lyzed the acute-care catastrophic health care expenditures of the elderly in
terms of their present insurance coverage.3 2 Based on their source of health
insurance coverage, three categories of elderly were identified:
1. Medicare only coverage;
2. Medicare and Medigap coverage; and
3. Medicare and Medicaid coverage.33
The distribution of the elderly in these three categories was twenty percent,
seventy-two percent and eight percent, respectively. 34 Nearly eleven percent
of acute-care costs were paid out-of-pocket by the enrollees.3 5 Moreover,
aged Medicare enrollees paid another seventeen and one-half percent of
acute-care costs in insurance premiums for Medicare Part B and/or Medi-
gap insurance.
36
Table 5 summarizes the study's results for the three categories of the eld-
erly. The elderly with only Medicare coverage incur the highest percentage
of health expenditures from out-of-pocket costs. 37 They pay relatively more
than twice as much of their health expenditures as those who have Medigap
policies.38 Yet, both groups finance about thirty percent of their total ex-
penditures when health insurance premiums are included. Nonetheless,
those who have the supplemental coverage are potentially less vulnerable to
high health care expenditures because of this added protection. Yet, only
those elderly who are covered by both Medicare and Medicaid are fully cov-
ered for their health care expenditures.3 9
There is an additional equity concern with the elderly. Tables 6 and 7
show the unequal distribution of health insurance coverage according to the
three populations analyzed in the Christensen study. The lower income eld-
31. Christensen, supra note 14, at 415; see also Rice & Gabel, Protecting the Elderly
Against High Health Care Costs, 5 HEALTH AFF. 5, 10 (Fall 1986).
32. Christensen, supra note 14, at 398.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 404-05.
35. Id. at 399.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 402.
38. Id. at 401.
39. Id. at 402.
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TABLE 5: ESTIMATED AVERAGE ACUTE HEALTH CARE COSTS AND
MEANS OF PAYMENT, FOR AGED MEDICARE ENROLLEES, BY
INSURANCE COVERAGE (1987)
Enrollee group, by insurance coverage
Medicare Medicare
All Only + +
Enrollees Medicare Medigap Medicaid
Total acute health care
costs (in dollars per
enrollee)*
All enrollees 3,351 3,254 3,220 4,725
With no hospital stays 817 752 808 1,090
With hospital stays 12,213 12,082 12,185 12,600
Share (in dollars) of
enrollees' costs paid by**
Medicare 2,414 2,346 2,288 3,677
Medicaid 87 0 0 1,048
Premiums 585 215 757 0
Out-of-pocket 361 693 310 0
Share (in percent) of
enrollees' costs paid by**
Medicare 72.0 72.1 71.0 77.8
Medicaid 2.6 0.0 0.0 22.2
Premiums 17.5 6.6 23.5 0.0
Out-of-pocket 10.8 21.3 9.6 0.0
SOURCE: Christensen, Long & Rodgers, Acute Health Care Costs for the Aged
Medicare Population: Overview and Policy Options, 65 MILBANK Q. 397,
400 (1987)
*Includes all costs for Medicare-covered services (including cost for all
inpatient days and for balance-billing by physicians) and for prescription
drugs, whether paid as insurance benefits or out-of-pocket by Medicare
enrollees.
**The shares sum to more than 100% of total costs for Medigap enrollees
and for all enrollees because of administrative expenses (above benefit costs)
included in Medigap premiums.
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TABLE 6: PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF AGED BY DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS, INCOME AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE (1984)
Family Income
< 5,000
5,000-8,999
9,000-14,999
15,000-24,999
25,000 +
Total
Insurance Group
All Only Medicare +
Enrollees Medicare Medigap
12 17 7
22 33 18
24 25 25
23 16 27
19 10 23
100 100 100
Medicare +
Medicaid
42
31
11
8
8
100
By Poverty Status
Poor
Non Poor
SOURCE: Christensen, Long & Rodgers, Acute Health Care Costs for the Aged Medicare
Population: Overview and Policy Options, 65 MILBANK Q. 397, 407 (1987)
TABLE 7: PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF AGED BY INCOME AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE (1984)
Family Income
< 5,000
5,000-8,999
9,000-14,999
15,000-24,999
25,000 +
All
Enrollees
100
100
100
100
100
Only
Medicare
29
30
21
14
10
Medicare +
Medigap
44
59
76
83
87
Medicare +
Medicaid
28
12
4
3
3
By Poverty Status
Poor
Non Poor
All Enrollees
SOURCE: Christensen, Long & Rodgers, Acute Health Care Costs for the Aged Medicare
Population: Overview and Policy Options, 65 MILBANK Q. 397, 408 (1987)
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erly have a much higher chance of coverage only through Medicare.'
Nearly thirty percent of aged enrollees with incomes under $9,000 lacked
private insurance coverage and were ineligible for Medicaid in 1984. These
results indicate that potentially large out-of-pocket expenditures for acute-
care exist primarily for the twenty percent of the elderly without supplemen-
tal coverage. Moreover, this group tends to be older, sicker, and less affluent
than the group that purchases Medigap coverage.4
Thomas Rice and Nelda McCall found in a study of six states that those
residents who were least able to afford the cost of a major illness-and there-
fore most in need of supplemental coverage-were the least likely to have
it.42 The group included non-white, low-income elderly in poor health.43
Analysis of data from the 1980 National Medical Care Utilization and Ex-
penditure Survey (Garfinkel study) confirmed these results.44 The private
Medicare supplement was smaller than average for low-income persons who
were less educated, unemployed, non-white, older (75 + years), and in
poorer health.45 Moreover, most of the Medigap policies did not provide
coverage where Medicare was obviously lacking-physician charges above
the Medicare payment, prescription drugs, and nursing home care.
46
B. The Impact of the MCCA
Table 8 provides a brief summary of the major changes in health care
coverage and financing introduced by the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act of 1988. 4' The Act focused primarily on acute-care and thus expanded
the benefits received under Medicare Parts A and B.4 The major changes in
coverage in Part A were: (i) covered hospital days were made unlimited and
(ii) beneficiary copayments for hospital stays were eliminated.49 There was
increased coverage for qualified stays in a certified skilled nursing facility,
40. Id. at 403.
41. Id. at 406.
42. Rice & McCall, The Extent of Ownership and the Characteristics of Medicare Supple-
mental Policies, 22 INQUIRY 188, 196 (Summer 1985).
43. Id. at 193.
44. Garfinkel, Bonito & McLeroy, Socioeconomic Factors and Medicare Supplemental
Health Insurance, 9 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 21 (Fall 1987).
45. Id. at 22-23.
46. Id. at 22; see also Christensen & Kasten, Covering Catastrophic Expenses Under Medi-
care, 7 HEALTH AFF. 79, 86 (Winter 1988).
47. Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
48. S. Christensen & R. Kasten, The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 1
(Congressional Budget Office Staff Working Paper, Oct. 1988) [hereinafter Working Paper].
49. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 101(1)(a), 102 Stat. 683, 685.
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hospice care, and home health care."0 The MCCA added to Part B a provi-
sion for prescription drug coverage51 and limited out-of-pocket expenses for
physician services.52 The Act also added new coverage for mammography
screening53 and a new respite care provision for payment to a family member
caring for an elderly person.5 4
Medicare enrollees (elderly and disabled) had the burden of financing
these new and expanded coverages. 5" This approach was in accord with the
philosophy of the benefits principle of equity practiced by the Reagan Ad-
ministration. Secretary Bowen had originally proposed an additional fixed
monthly premium to be paid by all enrollees.56 Congress retained the idea of
an overall benefits principle of equity but altered this proposal by adopting
one more focused on the ability-to-pay approach, thereby creating a more
complex financing mechanism. As passed by Congress, the flat financing
mechanism of the MCCA called for gradual increases in the fixed monthly
premium for the optional Part B coverage.57 This began as a four dollar
increase per month in 1989, and would have risen to ten dollars and twenty
cents per month in 1993 for catastrophic benefits. 58 But Congress, fearful of
the eventual impact on the lower income elderly, decided to collect sixty-
three percent of the cost via an income related supplemental premium. 59 It
was estimated that about two-fifths of the elderly would be liable for this
supplemental premium,60 which cost twenty-two dollars and fifty cents per
$150 of federal tax liability up to a cap of $800 per year for individuals and
$1,600 for couples. 61 This amounted to an income surtax that was mainly
aimed at the upper income elderly.
50. Pub. L. No. 100-360, §§ 205-206, 102 Stat. 683, 729-32; see also Iglehart, Medicare's
Benefits: "Catastrophic" Health Insurance, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 329, 330 (1989).
51. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 202, 102 Stat. 683, 702-21.
52. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 683, 700; see also Christensen & Kasten,
supra note 45, at 80.
53. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 204, 102 Stat. 683, 725-29.
54. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 205, 102 Stat. 683, 729-31.
55. Working Paper, supra note 48, at 7.
56. Christensen & Kasten, supra note 46, at 80.
57. Working Paper, supra note 48, at 7.
58. Id.
59. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 661, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 160, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 923, 938.
60. For a discussion of disproportionate payments, see Rovner, Senate Finance Tilting
Toward A Cut in Medicare Surtax, 47 CONG. Q. 1329 (1989); see also U.S. House of Represent-
atives, Select Committee on Aging, Press Release (Aug. 16, 1989) (detailing proposed "Cata-
strophic Fairness Amendment" to shift costs of MCCA away from poor and middle income
persons).
61. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 111(a), 102 Stat. 683, 689-98; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
661, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 153, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 923,
931.
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TABLE 8: A COMPARISON OF THE MEDICARE PROGRAM AFTER THE
ENACTMENT AND REPEAL OF MEDICARE CATASTROPHIC HEALTH
INSURANCE (1988-1990)
MEDICARE AFTER
MEDICARE CATA- REPEAL OF MEDI-
MEDICARE HEALTH STROPHIC HEALTH CARE CATA-
CATEGORIES OF SERVICES INSURANCE PRO- INSURANCE PRO- STROPHIC HEALTH
AND FINANCE GRAM (1988) GRAM (1989) INSURANCE (1990)
MEDICARE PART A: HOSPITAL COVERAGE
SERVICES
Inpatient Hospital Services
Psychiatric Care
Skilled Nursing Care
Hospice Care
Home Health Care
FINANCE
Deductible
Coinsurance
Premium
90 days per spell of
illness plus 60 day
lifetime reserve
days.
190 day limit.
100 days for quali-
fied stays in a
skilled nursing
facility.
Requirement that a
beneficiary be hospi-
talized for at least 3
days prior to entry
into a skilled nurs-
ing facility.
210 day limit.
Consecutive 21 day
limit.
Inpatient deductible
of the average cost
of a patient day per
spell.
Blood deductible up
to 3 units per spell.
Hospital coinsur-
ance paid for 61-90
days and for reserve
days.
Skilled nursing facil-
ity copayment for
21-100 days.
Basic flat premium.
Covers all hospitali-
zation cost after
patient pays a single
deductible.
Psychiatric limit
remains.
150 days for quali-
fied stays in a
skilled nursing
facility.
Eliminates require-
ment that a benefici-
ary be hospitalized
for at least 3 days
prior to entry into a
skilled nursing
facility.
Unlimited stay.
Extends consecutive
day limit to 38.
Retains inpatient
deductible.
Blood deductible
reduced to 3 units
per year.
Eliminates hospital
coinsurance.
Skilled nursing facil-
ity copayment for I-
8 days.
Imposes a supple-
mental income-
related premium
based on tax liabil-
ity up to a cap of
$800 per enrollee.
Repeals unlimited
hospital coverage
and returns to origi-
nal Medicare Care
Act restrictions.
Repeals expanded
coverage of skilled
nursing home care.
'Repeals expanded
coverage of hospice
stay.
Repeals expanded
coverage of home
health care.
Retains inpatient
deductible.
Retains new blood
deductible.
Reverts to original
hospital coinsur-
ance.
Reverts to original
skilled nursing
home coinsurance.
Repeals supplemen-
tal premium.
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MEDICARE AFTER
MEDICARE CATA- REPEAL OF MEDI-
MEDICARE HEALTH STROPHIC HEALTH CARE CATA-
CATEGORIES OF SERVICES INSURANCE PRO- INSURANCE PRO- STROPHIC HEALTH
AND FINANCE GRAM (1988) GRAM (1989) INSURANCE (1990)
SUPPLEMENTAL MEDICAL INSURANCE
PART B: PHYSICIAN AND OUTPATIENT
SERVICES
Physician and Outpatient
Services
FINANCE
Deductible
Coinsurance
Premium
Physician services.
Hospital outpatient
services.
Laboratory services.
Ambulatory surgical
services.
Drugs for transplant
patients.
Annual deductible
of $75.
20% of physician
charges plus excess
of physician
charges.
No copayment cap.
Basic flat premium.
Adds coverage for
mammography
screening.
Adds prescription
drug coverage (to be
phased in over
1991-1993).
New coverage for
respite care (up to
80 hours per year)
to unpaid family
member.
Annual deductible
of $75 counts
toward out-of-
pocket cap.
Adds prescription
drug deductible
($600 in 1991).
20% of physician
charges but sets a
cap on out-of-pocket
costs at $1370 after
which Medicare
pays full cost of
approved charges
for covered services.
50% copayment in
1991 to be reduced
to 20% in 1993 for
prescription drug
coverage.
Stipulates cap is to
be raised to hold
constant 7% pro-
portion of benefi-
ciaries.
Flat premium in
staged increases
(1989-1993) to pay
for new catastrophic
and prescription
drug coverage.
Repeals new cover-
age for mam-
mography screening.
Cancels future pre-
scription drug cov-
erage.
Repeals extended
coverage for respite
care.
Repeals out-of-
pocket cap on all
expenses.
Reverts to unlimited
liability.
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MEDICARE AFTER
MEDICARE CATA- REPEAL OF MEDI-
MEDICARE HEALTH STROPHIC HEALTH CARE CATA-
CATEGORIES OF SERVICES INSURANCE PRO- INSURANCE PRO- STROPHIC HEALTH
AND FINANCE GRAM (1988) GRAM (1989) INSURANCE (1990)
MEDICARE-MEDICAID CHANGES
SERVICES
Medicaid coverage for Varies according to
Pregnant Women and for stipulated States' eli-
Infants gibility requirements
and coverages.
Spousal Impoverishment Spouse must
for Nursing Home Care exhaust his/her
income and most
assets in order to be
eligible for Medicaid
coverage of nursing
home care.
FINANCE
Premiums Elderly and disabled
must meet States'
eligibility standards
for Medicaid cover-
age.
Non-eligible poor
elderly and disabled
are required to pay
Medicare premiums,
deductibles, and
coinsurance.
MISCELLANEOUS
Requires States to
provide Medicaid
coverage for prena-
tal care and cover-
age for infants up to
I year of age.
Curbs assets and
income "spend
down" requirements
for eligibility for
Medicaid coverage
for nursing home
care.
Requires States to
pay Medicare pre-
miums, deductibles,
and coinsurance
charges for elderly
and disabled benefi-
ciaries whose
incomes are below
the federal poverty
line but who are not
poor enough to
otherwise qualify for
Medicaid coverage.
Establishes a bipar-
tisan Commission
on Comprehensive
Care to examine
shortcomings in the
current health care
delivery and financ-
ing mechanisms that
limit or prevent
access to compre-
hensive care.
Maintains require-
ment for States to
provide Medicaid
coverage for preg-
nant women and
infants up to one
year of age if
income is below the
federal poverty
level.
Maintains higher
limits on income
and assets permitted
to spouse of Medi-
caid nursing home
recipient.
Maintains State pay-
ments of Medicare
premiums, deduct-
ibles, and coinsur-
ance for elderly and
disabled poor.
Maintains this Com-
mission as the Pep-
per Commission to
make recommenda-
tions for legislation
to cover the costs of
long-term care for
the elderly and to
ensure adequate
health insurance
coverage for the
estimated 37 million
uninsured Ameri-
cans.
SOURCE: Adapted from S. Christensen, Impact of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act on Enrollees by Selected Demographic Characteristics (Congressional
Budget Office Memorandum, Jan. 5, 1989); S. Christensen & R. Kasten, The
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (Congressional Budget Office
Staff Working Paper, Oct. 1988); Catastrophic-Costs Bill Is Sent to White
House, 46 CONG. Q. 1606 (1988)
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The Act also established a new limit of $1,370 on out-of-pocket costs re-
lated to the twenty percent coinsurance feature of physician charges.62
Above this cap Medicare would pay all approved charges for covered serv-
ices. In addition, a prescription drug deductible of $600 (for 1991) and a
fifty percent copayment provision were added.63
The Act also called for certain changes in the relationship between the
Medicare and Medicaid programs." It set a much higher limit on the
amount of income and assets that the spouse of a Medicaid beneficiary could
retain and still be eligible for nursing home care under Medicaid.65 The Act
required the states to pay Medicare required premiums, deductibles, and co-
insurance charges for the elderly and for disabled Medicare beneficiaries
with income below the federal poverty line but who were not poor enough by
state standards to qualify for Medicaid coverage.66 Each of these changes
were to be financed through the states rather than through Medicare
67premiums.
Table 9 reveals the impact of the financing mechanism for the MCCA.
Two-thirds of the single elderly and almost half of the married elderly paid
only the base premium. At the other extreme, only five to six percent of
single or married elderly paid the maximum supplemental premium. Table
10 provides a more accurate picture of the impact on the elderly by income
class. All elderly with incomes at or below $10,000 would have been spared
the supplemental premium. Those hardest hit would have been single bene-
ficiaries with incomes of $40,000 and those married beneficiaries with in-
comes of $80,000. The combined increase in the basic and supplemental
premium contributions would have amounted to about two percent of their
incomes.
C. Estimating the Financial Impact of MCCA on the Elderly:
Costs vs. Benefits
Sandra Christensen and Rick Kasten simulated the effects of the passage
of the MCCA on the elderly population for the calendar year 1988.68 Their
analysis assumed that all of the benefits would be available to the elderly in
the first year and that no enrollee would be liable for copayments in excess of
62. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 683, 699-702.
63. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 202(b), 102 Stat. 683, 704-13.
64. Working Paper, supra note 48, at 5.
65. Id. See generally MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 8.
66. Working Paper, supra note 48, at 5.
67. Id.
68. Christensen & Kasten, supra note 46; see also S. Christensen, Impact of the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act on Enrollees by Selected Demographic Characteristics (Congres-
sional Budget Office Memorandum, Jan. 5, 1989).
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TABLE 9: IMPACT OF MCCA PREMIUMS ON ELDERLY (1989)
Percent Distribution of Premium
Married Single
Premium Charged Enrollees Enrollees
(%) (%)
Basic Premium Only 47.5 66.3
< 250 27.2 21.0
250-499 9.4 4.6
500-799 9.9 2.6
800 5.9 5.4
SOURCE: Rovner, Catastrophic Insurance Law: Costs vs. Benefits, 46 CONG. Q. 3450,
3451 (1988) (data collected by American Association of Retired Persons)
TABLE 10: INCIDENCE OF SUPPLEMENTAL PREMIUM BY HOUSEHOLD
INCOME GROUP OF ELDERLY (1989)
Household Income Married Enrollees Single Enrollees
(Prems./Person) (Prems.)
$10,000 0 0
15,000 N/A $68
20,000 23 N/A
45,000 N/A 800
90,000 800 800
SOURCE: Rovner, Catastrophic Insurance Law: Cost vs. Benefits, 46 CONG. Q. 3450,
3450 (1988)
$2,500.69 One of the major objectives of the MCCA was to protect those
Medicare enrollees currently without supplemental coverage against very
high copayment costs.70 A key finding was that the net result of the MCCA
was to reduce the out-of-pocket costs (direct costs plus premiums) for the
poor and the near poor enrollees while increasing costs for other groups.71
Table 11 is an extension of the simulation provided by Christensen and
Kasten.72 The MCCA would generate a financial gain for lower income en-
rollees and a financial loss for the higher income group.7 3 In effect, there
would have been an income transfer from the more fortunate to the less
69. Christensen & Kasten, supra note 46, at 85, 88.
70. Id. at 88-89.
71. Id. at 89-90.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 90.
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fortunate elderly.74 Yet, all enrollees would continue to receive a subsidy in
total benefits from Medicare.75
Since the program was defined as budget-neutral-i.e., it would leave un-
affected net federal expenditures-the new premiums were designed to ex-
ceed the overall projected benefit payments.76 The new premium liabilities
would have been less than the new projected benefits for the lower income
enrollees and would have been higher than the projected benefits for the
higher income elderly.77 This is seen in Table 12.
Having analyzed the impact of the MCCA, the causes of its repeal are
next examined.
IV. THE CAUSES OF THE MCCA REVERSAL
Seven key factors that led to the reversal of MCCA bear significantly to
the equity issues discussed in this article.
First and foremost, the method of financing a health insurance program
for a presumed dependent subgroup of the population was unprecedented
and clearly reflected a change in the then applied concept of economic eq-
uity. President Reagan and Secretary Bowen applied a benefits principle to-
ward intergroup equity; those who benefitted from the provision of this
program would pay for it. Moreover, applying a fixed-premium payment to
all elderly suggested an intraelderly equity principle based on an equal dollar
sacrifice.
Congress' view of financial equity stemmed from both the benefits princi-
ple and the ability-to-pay principle. The former was applied to intergroup
equity across income classes and age groups in society; only those receiving
immediate benefits would be required to pay. The compromise financing
mechanism of the fixed premium and income-adjusted supplemental pre-
mium applied the ability-to-pay principle to intraelderly equity. This pay-
ment mechanism required a minimum equal dollar payment of which all
elderly contributed and an additional payment based on a progressive tax on
the elderly who pay federal income tax.
Only in terms of the truly indigent Medicare population did the generally
accepted ability-to-pay principle of intergroup equity apply. The out-of-
pocket health care expenditures of the near poor elderly and disabled were to
be financed by the rest of the population.
The view of economic equity which applied to the elderly under the
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 91.
77. Id.
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MCCA clearly represented a break with tradition. Historically, the equity
principle for financing the health care of the elderly under Medicare was
based on intergroup equity. That is, the elderly would be asked to finance a
small amount of their health care, but the vast majority of the population
would be required to subsidize the elderly's health care expenditures. The
financing equity principle was to be based on one's ability to pay, with the
elderly considered more dependent and financially vulnerable. Therefore,
equity across groups in the United States would call for a financing mecha-
nism which transferred income from the generally more affluent and
younger population to the less affluent and older population. This viewpoint
was based upon the Government's accepted function of creating a fair distri-
bution of public services. The MCCA, however, altered this long-standing
view of equity as applied in public distribution policy.
In addition to asking the elderly to shoulder the burden of their own
health benefits package, their marginal tax rates were increased at a time
when the marginal tax rates for the rest of the population were being re-
duced. While the rest of the population was placed into three tax brackets of
fifteen percent, twenty-eight percent, or thirty-three percent after the 1986
Tax Reform Act,7" the elderly's marginal tax rate increased from fifteen per-
cent to twenty-two percent in the very first year.79 Their tax liability contin-
ued to grow every year thereafter because taxes were to increase
automatically each year to pay for the anticipated future benefits. The
Treasury Department estimated that the elderly would face a marginal tax
rate of twenty-five percent by 1992.80 The supplemental premium amounted
approximately to a fifteen percent surtax (a tax on a tax liability) of those
with at least a $150 tax liability. As a result, the elderly faced a higher
income tax burden at various income ranges than did many other taxpayers,
creating a great tax inequity.
Third, the more affluent elderly opposed the MCCA. Many elderly com-
plained of the sharp increase in premiums that they would be forced to pay;
a minority of the elderly (the top forty percent) were being asked to subsi-
dize the cost of new benefits for the majority (the other sixty percent).8 ' Yet,
the very subgroup of the elderly bearing this burden were the least in need of
78. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
79. Ferrara, Commentary, 24 INQUIRY 321, 322 (1987).
80. Id.; see also Ostrow, Reagan Scores House Medical Plan, L.A. Times, July 26, 1987, at
14, col. 1.
81. On the eve of the Congressional repeal of the MCCA, Arizona Senator John McCain
warned that a total repeal would "cause a backlash of enormous proportions when the 60
percent who were never going to have to pay the surtax find out that they lose these benefits."
Rich, Congress Nears Repeal of "Catastrophic" Tax and Major Benefits, Wash. Post, Nov. 22,
1989, at AS, col. 1.
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the program. The analysis contained in this article shows that the elderly
most covered by Medigap policies had higher incomes, more education, and
were in better health while the net benefits of MCCA would accrue to the
near poor elderly who could not afford Medigap supplemental policies.
In addition, there were other intragroup inequities generated by the Act.
The Act affected members of the affluent elderly differently, thereby violat-
ing horizontal equity. For the working elderly, similar or better coverage
was already provided by their employers. Moreover, for many of those who
were retired and were covered with Medigap policies, the premiums were
paid or subsidized by a former employer. Many federal retirees had gener-
ous health plans provided by the Government, which at least partially offset
the costs.
Congress also made a severe political blunder by front-loading the in-
creased cost of the program. Facing the dilemma of the huge federal budget
deficit and the budgetary constraints demanded by the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act, 2 Congress raised the premiums for the MCCA much faster,
and much sooner, than the actual receipt of benefits by the elderly. This was
done to ensure that the MCCA would be sufficiently financed for the pro-
jected costs of present and future beneficiaries. The elderly were also aware
that future premiums would be increased to help cover future phased-in ben-
efits. Both the high present premiums and the future rising premiums made
it difficult for the elderly to assess their benefits relative to the costs. More-
over, many of the affluent elderly believed that they would pay more for
catastrophic coverage than they were paying for Medigap policies-some
with superior coverage. They also perceived that they were being asked to
finance the health care expenditures of a large and more expensive group of
beneficiaries.
The original Medicare Act called for coverage of the aged (65 years or
older).83 In the 1972 Social Security Act Amendments, Congress added cov-
erage for disabled persons who had received cash benefits for at least twenty-
four months under the disability insurance provisions of the Social Security
Act.84 Opponents of the MCCA raised the specter of the high cost of AIDS
care being forced upon the elderly.85 This was because, under Social Secur-
ity Disability coverage, individuals with various disabling diseases (including
82. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1037 (codified principally at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. 1990)).
83. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp.
1990)).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. 1990).
85. See, e.g., Rovner, Reagan Threatens a Veto: House OK's Medicare Expansion Despite
Reservations Over Cost, 45 CONG. Q. 1637, 1638-39 (1987).
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AIDS) were eligible for Medicare after the two-year waiting period. 6 Con-
gress also expanded coverage to include indigent mothers and infants.87
Since future increases in MCCA premiums were tied to the growth of Medi-
care health care expenditures, the affluent elderly were greatly concerned
that they were being asked to finance the benefits of two potentially very
expensive (and dependent) groups in the population.
They were greatly misled. The expanded coverage for indigent mothers
and infants was to come under Medicaid and was thus financed by general
revenues of federal and state governments, not Medicare premiums. In addi-
tion, the Social Security Disability provision was not disease-specific (in
other words, not only related to AIDS victims).88 Many AIDS victims die
long before the two-year waiting period is realized, an unfortunate reality
that indirectly benefitted the elderly in economic terms. It has been esti-
mated that AIDS patients would account only for one percent of the pro-
jected 1993 Medicare expenditures.8 9
Finally, the Act failed to address the elderly's real perceived need for cata-
strophic health care coverage related to long-term care.' When the MCCA
was introduced, many elderly believed that it would cover long-term nursing
home care.9 In actuality, it did not. This left the elderly as financially vul-
nerable to the danger of needing long-term care as they were before the pas-
sage of the Act. Although many elderly are acutely aware of the need to
"spend down" their assets below the stringent welfare requirements in order
to receive Medicaid, this eligibility requirement could force them into pov-
erty and dependency, two of the elderly's greatest fears.92 Estimates have
86. Id.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(n) (Supp. 1990).
88. The insurance program for which entitlement is established by sections 426 and
426-1 of this title provides basic protection against the costs of hospital, related post-
hospital, home health services, and hospice care in accordance with this part for...
(2) individuals under age 65 who have been entitled for not less than 24 months to
benefits under subchapter II of this chapter (or would have been so entitled to such
benefits if certain government employment were covered employment under such
subchapter) or under the railroad retirement system on the basis of the disability ....
42 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. 1990); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c(3) (Supp. 1990) ("certain individuals
who did not meet the conditions specified in either clause (1) or (2) but who are medically
determined to have end stage renal disease").
89. Rovner, Catastrophic-Insurance Law: Costs vs. Benefits, 46 CONG. Q. 3450, 3451
(1988).
90. "Long-term care refers to care, medical or otherwise, needed by chronically ill or
disabled individuals who need assistance in dressing, bathing, feeding themselves and other
tasks of daily living." Rovner, Issue is Gaining Political Momentum: Lawmakers Taking Hard
Look At Problem of Long-Term Care, 46 CONG. Q. 938, 938 (1988).
91. Cohen, supra note 10, at 501.
92. Rice & Gabel, supra note 31, at 6.
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indicated that the probability of an elderly person entering a nursing home
or some type of long-term care facility is between twenty-five and forty-three
percent.93 Medicare Catastrophic Health Insurance, like the entire program
itself, failed even to address this problem.
In summary, the Medicare Catastrophic Health Insurance Act was re-
pealed because:
1. It applied to the elderly a new benefits principle of equity instead of
the established ability-to-pay principle.
2. It violated principles of horizontal equity by treating all elderly
equally when they were very unequal in terms of the health insurance premi-
ums and tax burdens they shouldered.
3. In terms of intergroup tax equity, it raised the elderly's tax burden
relative to the rest of the population during an era of tax reduction.
4. It attempted to solve a problem-catastrophic health expenditures for
acute-care-that was perceived to affect all of the elderly but which, upon
closer examination, only affected the less affluent (and less vocal) minority of
the elderly.
5. It raised fears in the affluent elderly that they would be forced to pay
much higher premiums than they actually would have incurred for coverage
of their less fortunate aged group members as well as other dependent
populations.
6. It front-loaded the costs of the program and delayed some of the bene-
fits, making it appear that the benefits were not worth the costs.
7. It failed to address the elderly's major fear of financial catastrophe-
long-term care.
V. CATASTROPHIC HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES AND UNRESOLVED
EQUITY ISSUES
So the question remains: Do the elderly need catastrophic health insur-
ance coverage? And, if so, who should finance such a program? The answer
appears to be twofold. For acute-care, only a minority of the elderly require
additional coverage. For long-term care, there is a much greater need for
the vast majority of the elderly. Yet, contained within this issue are the
unresolved economic equity issues raised at the beginning of this article.
A. Intergroup Equity
Are the elderly as a group relatively poor as some analysts have claimed?
93. Cohen, Tell & Wallack, The Lifetime Risks and Costs of Nursing Home Use Among
the Elderly, 24 MED. CARE 1161, 1167 (1986) [hereinafter Lifetime Risks].
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Or are they now more affluent and not in need of a subsidy from the rest of
the population? The critical equity concern here is whether the elderly are
still a dependent group. If they are, then the rest of society should finance
their health expenditures under the ability-to-pay principle. If they have the
capacity to finance their own care, then they should finance their own health
care expenditures under the benefits principle; society should use its scarce
resources to subsidize the care of other truly needy dependent groups.
Stephen Crystal argues that "[e]conomic disadvantage is widely perceived
to be typical of the elderly."94 When Medicare was implemented, poverty
was widespread among the elderly. In 1967 roughly thirty percent of the
elderly were classified at or below the official poverty line. With the persis-
tence of this view, society's response through public policy has been -to up-
grade greatly the relative economic status of the elderly. Large subsidies to
the elderly, both in income and in-kind goods and services, have greatly re-
duced, if not eliminated, the economic gap between the elderly and the rest
of the population. This was evident even during the Reagan years of budget
reallocation away from social services and general assistance to the poor.95
In addition, Paul Feldstein argues that the income of the elderly, relative
to the non-elderly, has been largely underestimated, thereby making it ap-
pear that the elderly are relatively poorer than they actually may be.96 He
cites five reasons for this downward bias: (i) the aged pay on average much
lower taxes compared to the rest of the population; (ii) they have a much
higher proportion of fully owned homes; (iii) imputed rent on such in-kind
value would substantially raise their incomes; (iv) they receive many in-kind
subsidies such as housing, food stamps, meal services, and health care; and
(v) they earn a disproportionate share of different types of income (e.g., pen-
sions, interest, and dividends) that typically are underreported. 97
Crystal attempted to adjust the income of the elderly for differential tax
rates and underreporting of income and found that the after-tax average
household income of the elderly in 1983 would rise to ninety-three percent of
the non-elderly compared to seventy-one percent without these adjust-
ments.98 In general, he reported that the income of the elderly is underre-
ported by roughly eleven percent. Moreover, the sources of income that are
most underreported constitute a greater proportion of income for the higher
94. Crystal, Measuring Income and Inequality Among the Elderly, 26 GERONTOLOGIST
56, 56 (1986).
95. Moon, Impact of the Reagan Years on the Distribution of Income of the Elderly, 26
GERONTOLOGIST 32, 34 (1986).
96. P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 564-65 (3d ed. 1988).
97. Id.
98. Crystal, supra note 94, at 56-59.
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income elderly. As a result, the unequal income distribution of the elderly
reported earlier is even greater. Feldstein concludes: "The stereotype of the
elderly as a poor group is clearly wrong, although there are certainly many
poor elderly."99
There is a similar debate about the relative affluence of the elderly.
Thomas Getzen proposes that there is a "middle classing"' of the elderly
and that they are "the wealthiest segment of American society." '' He re-
ported the distribution of income and wealth for elderly couples and single
persons based on a survey of retirees by the Social Security Administration
for 1982.102 Table 13 reveals three characteristics of elderly wealth: (i) it is
more unequally distributed than income; (ii) couples have much higher
wealth.per capita than single elderly; and (iii) single men have much higher
wealth than single women. The latter of these is particularly noteworthy
because women typically outlive men by five to seven years, and elderly sin-
gle women presently constitute the greatest proportion of the old aged (sev-
enty-five years of age and over).
More recent data on wealth distribution of the elderly, relative to the rest
of the population, also indicate that the elderly are comparatively more afflu-
ent than previously believed. Table 14 shows that the wealth distribution of
the elderly is much higher than for the rest of the population. Over half of
the elderly have wealth accumulations of $50,000 or more, compared to
about forty percent of the total population. The relatively higher affluence of
the elderly and the value of their assets suggest that they may be much more
able to finance long-term care from their wealth.
B. Intraelderly Equity: Rich vs. Poor
Even if the elderly as a group are not as relatively impoverished as first
believed, there still remains a very unequal distribution of economic re-
sources among the elderly population itself. In terms of income, Table 13
reflects the wide distribution of income of the elderly, ranging from the low-
est group with $8,900 to the highest group with $52,500 for couples in 1982.
A relatively lower income position of the single elderly and a relatively
poorer status of elderly females also exists. Wealth is even more unevenly
distributed; the lowest thirty percent of elderly couples have assets of $6,000
or less and, of elderly singles, have zero financial assets.
While the elderly poor have the fewest resources, the financial burden of
99. FELDSTEIN, supra note 96, at 565.
100. Getzen, Longlife Insurance: A Prototype for Funding Long-Term Care, 10 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV. 47, 47 (1988).
101. Id. at 54.
102. Id. at 52.
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TABLE 14: WEALTH DISTRIBUTION OF ELDERLY AND TOTAL
POPULATION: U.S. (1984)
Income Group Elderly Total Pop. Relative Wealth Position
of Elderly1
(%) (%) (Elderly/Total Pop.)
negative or zero 6.7 11.0 0.61
1 < 4,999 8.7 15.3 0.57
5,000 - 9,999 4.0 6.4 0.63
10,000 - 24,999 9.1 12.4 0.73
25,000 - 49,999 15.5 14.5 1.07
50,000 - 99,999 24.7 19.3 1.28
100,000 - 249,999 23.1 15.3 1.51
250,000 + 8.2 5.9 1.39
SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLD WEALTH AND ASSET
OWNERSHIP, 1984 18-19 (1986)
Author's estimates
health care disproportionately affects them. Davis and Rowland cite a Con-
gressional Budget Office study showing that out-of-pocket acute-care health
expenditures represent two percent of total income in families with incomes
in excess of $30,000, while they represent twenty-one percent in families
with income of less than $5,000. 103
Moreover, as seen from the previous discussion of Medigap coverage, po-
tentially large out-of-pocket expenditures for acute care exist primarily for
the twenty percent of the elderly who lack private Medigap coverage and are
ineligible for Medicaid. This group is older, sicker, less educated, and less
affluent than those covered by private supplemental policies. Thus, an in-
traelderly equity concern remains, which stems from the inequality within
the elderly population and the inequity of Government Medicaid policy be-
tween the poor and the near poor.
The previous analyses only account for acute-care health expenditures of
the elderly. Yet, the elderly's concern about long-term care expenditures
and the lack of protection against these expenditures was one of the main
causes of their rejection of the MCCA. So, the question arises: What are the
economic equity impacts of long-term care expenditures? Very little re-
search has been completed on this question, and much more needs to be
done. Rice and Gabel offer an attempt at a much more comprehensive study
of the catastrophic health care expenditures faced by the elderly by including
both acute-care and long-term care expenditures from two separate data
103. DAVIS & ROWLAND, supra note 9, at 35.
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sets."° They find that the elderly as a group are at the highest risk of incur-
ring high health care expenditures in the population. Even with Medicare,
Medicaid, and Medigap policies, twenty-five percent of the elderly's health
care expenditures is paid out-of-pocket. 105
Table 15 presents the out-of-pocket health expenditures by the elderly.
This Table shows the types of services that are responsible for high out-of-
pocket expenditures. For those with out-of-pocket expenditures of less than
$500, ninety-five percent of these expenditures are attributable to physician,
drug, and dental services. For the expenditure categories of $500-1,000 and
$1,001-$2,000, these three services still dominate, accounting for eighty-five
percent and seventy percent of out-of-pocket expenditures, respectively.
Yet, "a dramatic change occurs in the category of people with out-of-pocket
expenses over $2,000 a year." 10 6 Nursing home costs were responsible for
over eighty percent of out-of-pocket expenditures.
TABLE 15: PERCENTAGE OF OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH EXPENDITURES
OF THE ELDERLY BY TYPE OF SERVICE (1980)
Less than $501- $1,000- More than
Category $500 1,000 2,000 $2,000
Hospital 2.9 11.5 20.9 10.0
Physician 40.9 34.6 40.9 5.9
Dental 14.0 19.3 12.6 1.7
Drugs 41.1 31.2 16.2 1.2
Nursing Home 1.1 3.5 9.5 81.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Adapted from Rice & Gabel, Protecting the Elderly Against High Health Care
Costs, 5 HEALTH AFF. 5, 16 (1986)
Moreover, the Cohen study found that the expected lifetime costs of nurs-
ing home care across all ages are estimated to be between $10,500 and
$13,600. 107 Yet, only thirteen percent of the elderly account for ninety per-
cent of all nursing home expenditures. It has also been estimated that, on
average, it would take two years of nursing home expenditures to eliminate
the average wealth of the elderly.
In sum, these results indicate that the real threat to the financial stability
of the elderly is the cost of nursing home care. It is very expensive and has
104. Rice & Gabel, supra note 31, at 5.
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id. at 17.
107. Lifetime Risks, supra note 93, at 1169.
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the potential of being truly catastrophic to the elderly. Despite this threat,
the elderly are virtually unprotected from this catastrophic expenditure in
terms of insurance coverage, and eventually must rely either on extended
family resources or Medicaid. The MCCA would not have been effective in
alleviating this risk.
This analysis demonstrates that the distribution of income within the eld-
erly population (intraelderly equity) now poses a more serious concern than
the distribution of income between the elderly and the non-elderly popula-
tion (intergroup equity). Therefore, given the great strides made by the eld-
erly over the past twenty-five years, the fundamental equity concern has
shifted from correcting the economically disadvantaged position of the eld-
erly in relation to the rest of the population to the equity concern for a mi-
nority of the near-poor disadvantaged elderly. Perhaps it is time to uncouple
the concern for old age from the concern for low income.
C. Interfamily Equity: The Inheritance Factor
Another equity issue involves the transfer of the elderly's wealth to their
offspring. The wealth of the present elderly generation will be at the disposal
of the succeeding generation. Consequently, adult children of the elderly
have an economic stake in the protection of this potential inheritance of
wealth: Should they be unwilling to finance a health insurance program to
protect their elderly parents from economic disaster? The real incentive is to
protect elderly parents from having to "spend down" their wealth in order to
become eligible for Medicaid. Clearly, the major risk facing the elderly is
long-term care expenditures. This concern raises two questions, one concep-
tual and the other practical.
Conceptually, what is the proper familial unit for analyzing the economic
state of the elderly and, ultimately, for creating public policy? Do we focus
on the elderly individual or household, or the extended family of the elderly?
Past policy analysis has tended to accept the former. Yet, Congress took a
small step toward acknowledging the latter view in the MCCA by providing
a benefit under the respite care provision for custodial care by a family mem-
ber.1 °8 This recognized the link between the elderly parent and the adult
child who often has to provide home care.
Practically, the adult children of elderly parents might be willing to fi-
nance a catastrophic health insurance program. Clearly, even in this time of
budget tightening and new taxes, the adult children of the elderly would be
more willing to finance such a program if the program genuinely protected
the wealth of the elderly. They might have to be educated about the benefits
108. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 205(c)(3), 102 Stat. 683, 731 (1988).
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of this insurance in the protection of their own future inheritances. How-
ever, this requires an approach that would protect against not only cata-
strophic health expenditures for acute-care, but also long-term care. This
protection, for at least some of the elderly, could be purchased privately by
the affluent or the extended families of the elderly.
D. Intergenerational Equity
At issue in intergenerational equity is whether too much money is spent
on the elderly, foregoing aid to other, more vulnerable (and perhaps more
valuable) members of the society, like children. An analysis of the most
recent data on poverty status (Table 16) indicates that children are our most
impoverished age group in the population.
TABLE 16: NUMBER AND PERCENT OF PERSONS AND FAMILIES BELOW
POVERTY LEVEL BY AGE GROUP: U.S. (1988)
Persons Families
Age Group No. (m) % Age Group No. (m) %
< 5 years 10.96 20.5 15-24 0.89 29.7
15-24 5.62 15.7 25-34 2.27 15.0
25-44 7.77 9.8 35-44 1.50 9.2
45-54 1.90 7.7 45-54 0.78 0.9
55-64 2.15 10.0 55-64 0.76 7.8
65 + 3.48 12.0 65 + 0.70 6.6
Total 31.88 13.1 Total 6.88 10.4
SOURCE: U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1988 57, 68 (1989)
The determination of which criteria should be used to guide difficult
choices over the allocation of resources in the aging society is at the heart of
this question. Echoing the previous discussion of the relative economic posi-
tion of the elderly, B.L. Neugaerten has "suggested that the heterogeneity of
the elderly population means that age is becoming increasingly irrelevant as
a criteria for distributing social benefits and that more emphasis should be
placed on need."' 9
This concern for intergenerational equity has lead some analysts to con-
clude that too many resources are consumed by the elderly to the disadvan-
tage of the young. This in turn has raised serious questions about the large
109. Kingson, Generational Equity: An Unexpected Opportunity to Broaden the Politics of
Aging, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 765, 766 (1988).
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allocation of scarce health care resources to the dying elderly. Victor Fuchs
has asserted that the United States spends about one percent of its GNP on
health care for the elderly who are in their last year of life. He concludes
that "[o]ne of the biggest challenges facing policy makers for the rest of this
century will be how to strike an appropriate balance between care of the
(elderly) dying and health services for the rest of the population."" In
concurrence, Daniel Callahan has proposed that we set "prudent limits" on
the allocation of health care resources to the elderly."' These limits would
be applied in cases where: "beneficiaries are primarily the elderly, indefinite
life extension is sought, the costs are high, and the population-wide benefits
are slight.""' 2 This view has raised serious concerns over the emphasis on a
zero-sum view of health care resource allocation across the generations.
Another view, instead of stressing intergenerational competitiveness, fo-
cuses on intergenerational interdependence. " 3 This argument holds that all
generations have a common interest in publicly funded intergenerational
transfers and rests on the public good concept often used by economists to
determine the proper role of Government in various markets. This view is
also similar to the position argued in this article concerning the role of adult
children in financing a program for catastrophic health care expenditures for
their elderly parents.
Finally, there is the political reality of interest group politics. The rise and
fall of the MCCA presents an example of the use of the political power of the
affluent elderly to stifle a program that would have benefited the poorer and
more vulnerable elderly. Because the poor generally tend to be politically
weaker than the affluent in all groups, policy makers prefer to take a univer-
salist approach (one that serves the whole) when allocating health care serv-
ices rather than a selective approach (one serving just the poor). In this way,
the poor are aided by the meshing of their interests with those of the affluent.
Perhaps in the case of the elderly, the universality approach needs to be
applied across all groups rather than simply across the elderly. Somehow,
the affluent elderly believe that they should not be required to finance the
health care expenditures of the poor elderly.
VI. CONCLUSION: FUTURE POLICY DIRECTION
This article has investigated the economic equity concerns of the elderly in
relationship to catastrophic health care expenditures. It has analyzed the
110. D. CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY 130
(1987).
111. Id. at 223.
112. Id.
113. Kingson, supra note 109, at 772.
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impact of the passage and the repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act, both on the distribution of health care resources and the distribution of
health care financial burdens. The continuing unresolved issues of equity
concerning the elderly versus the rest of the population have also been con-
sidered. In conclusion, the following policy proposals are offered for creat-
ing greater equity in regard to health care for the elderly.
Future policy toward catastrophic health care expenditures could take one
of two general directions: First, the creation of an expanded but targeted
health insurance program for the low income (near poor) elderly, financed
by the population through general revenues; second, a universal health in-
surance program funded by all members of society. The Government's fail-
ure to provide critical health and social services, not widely available
through the private sector, simply shifts most of the cost to individuals and
their families. This ultimately may increase the total cost to society as more
elderly spend their last years in nursing homes paid with Medicaid funds.
The main question centers on the appropriate mix of public, familial, and
individual responsibility emphasized by society. A general principle of ac-
ceptance of the elderly as a responsibility of the nation through the federal
and state governments is consistent with the universal entitlement of the
Medicare program. However, programs that recognize the role of the ex-
tended family in providing care for their elderly parents should be
encouraged.
The elderly population is not a homogeneous group. Actually, many of
the elderly have become much more affluent and should no longer be consid-
ered as dependent upon the rest of the population. However, the lower quin-
tile or quarter of the elderly are very poor and do require such assistance.
The group most at risk, from an economic perspective, is the near poor be-
cause they must rely solely on Medicare, whereas the poor elderly receive
supplementation by Medicaid, and the affluent elderly are covered by Medi-
gap policies. Yet, even the poor elderly are at risk in an era of budget reduc-
tion because of state cutbacks in funding Medicaid programs.
Therefore, to improve intraelderly equity, I propose a national program of
catastrophic health insurance as Part C of Medicare. "Part C" would stipu-
late that any acute-care expenditures, totalling more than ten percent of the
elderly household income, would be covered by the federal government. All
elderly who are below 150% of the federal poverty line would be eligible.
Flat premiums would be charged to this group but paid.for by the respective
state governments. Though this would increase state expenditures, the fed-
eralization of elderly poor Medicaid expenditures would reduce state ex-
penditures to a greater extent.
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This program would greatly improve equity for acute-care health expendi-
tures. However, the greatest crisis facing all of the elderly is that of long-
term care expenditures. The goal of any catastrophic care policy must there-
fore be to maintain the elderly as a financially viable population, without
forcing them into poverty either by absorbing all of their financial resources
to pay for costly nursing home care or by requiring them to "spend down" in
order to meet state Medicaid requirements. Moreover, policy makers must
recognize the interdependence of the elderly and their children in providing,
and paying for, long-term care. To create more interfamily equity, the fed-
eral government should also enact an optional Medicare Part D long-term
care insurance program. The elderly would have the option of selecting
"Part D" or obtaining their own coverage through private insurance. " 4 The
premiums for this program would increase with elderly ability to pay. Those
poor and near-poor elderly (below 150% of the federal poverty line) would
have their premiums paid by their state governments. Expenditures for
long-term care for the poor would be paid by the federal government.
Children of elderly parents would be given two types of financial incen-
tives to aid their parents. First, they would be allowed a tax deduction for
paying the premiums of long-term care insurance (public or private) for their
elderly parents. Second, those who chose to care for their parents in their
own homes would receive an elderly parent care tax credit.5 This provi-
sion would recognize the important contribution that adult children make in
providing care for their parents, and also offer the children a subsidized al-
ternative to institutional care. These proposals would go far in achieving
interfamily equity.
The main funding mechanism for both of these proposals would be at-
tained through the removal of the income ceiling on the Social Security-
Medicare Tax. This would greatly improve the tax equity in financing Medi-
care as a whole. It would also provide large revenues because taxation
would occur at much higher incomes than the present tax rate related to
Medicare.
More attention must be given to the relative distribution of income and
health care resources with regard to children and the elderly-i.e., the in-
114. For further discussion of the possibility of private long-term care insurance for the
elderly, see generally Wiener, Ehrenworth & Spence, Private Long-Term Care Insurance. Cost,
Coverage, and Restrictions, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 487 (1982); Weiner & Meiners, Private Long-
Term Care Insurance: Simulations of a Potential Market, 27 MED. CARE 182 (1989); Cohn,
One Proposal for Elder Care: Private-Public Compromise, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1989, Health,
at 11, col. 2.
115. For further discussion of family-oriented policies, see generally Wisensale, Genera-
tional Equity and Intergenerational Policies, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 773 (1988).
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tergenerational equity issue. While this has important ethical implications
for society in terms of efficient health care resource allocation, it is essential
that the extended family of the elderly have greater decisionmaking author-
ity. As a Nation, we have attempted to provide so many entitlements to
dependent groups that we sometimes fail to recognize the need to define lim-
its to resource use, especially in health care. In order to address the
problems of intergenerational equity, it is time to establish uniform guide-
lines for the use of health care resources in the last year of a person's life.
The Pepper Commission or a similarly appointed organization could investi-
gate this concern. 16
In conclusion, these proposals would facilitate the creation of greater eq-
uity in the distribution of health care resources and health care financial
burdens not only for the elderly but for all members of our society.
116. U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care, Pub. L. No. 100-360,
102 Stat. 765 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b note (Supp. 1990)); see also Relman, Universal
Health Insurance: It's Time Has Come, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 117 (1989).
1991]

